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Abstract
Problem deﬁnition: We consider a shipper transporting and selling a short-life-cycle
product to a destination market. Customers in the destination market obtain higher util-
ity if they receive the product earlier but their time preferences are heterogeneous. Two
transportation service providers (i.e., carriers) oﬀer distinct speeds and competing freight
rates. This study analyzes the shipper’s optimal shipping strategy under carrier compe-
tition. Academic/Practical relevance: Perishable products are commonly shipped via
multiple means of transport. The faster the mode of transport is, the more expensive it
is, but speed enables the product to reach the market with higher quality. In addition to
the trade-oﬀ between speed and cost, the competition between carriers can also inﬂuence
the shipper’s transportation procurement strategies. Our model highlights the implications
of carrier competition in a dual sourcing problem. Methodology: We study a two-stage
game-theoretical framework: Carriers ﬁrst compete on freight rates, and then the shipper
determines the shipping schedule. Results: The shipper may beneﬁt from product diﬀer-
entiation via dual-mode shipping, in which the shipment that arrives earlier is sold at a
premium price. In equilibrium, the shipper’s proﬁt can be U-shaped in the speed diﬀerence
between carriers. Dual sourcing may be inferior to simply restricting a single shipping service
in a winner-take-all fashion. Managerial implications: This study reveals an underly-
ing trade-oﬀ between the operational advantage from product diﬀerentiation and the cost
advantage from carrier competition. To beneﬁt from either of these advantages, a shipper
should use two carriers with either very distinct or very similar speeds. Single sourcing may
bring an additional cost advantage that outweighs the value of production diﬀerentiation
through dual sourcing.
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1 Introduction
In the contemporary logistics market, merchandise is transported via multiple modes, including
air, road, rail and sea. Mangoes are imported from Brazil, Peru, and other non-European
countries to the European Union (EU) both by air and by ocean (Sangho et al., 2011; Araújo and
Garcia, 2016), for a total volume of 300,000 tons that in 2015 was worth upwards of 522 million
Euros (CBI, 2016). Scandinavian seafood is exported by air, road and ocean (Larsen, 2003).
Seafood exports from Norway alone achieved 10.59 billion US Dollars in 2016 (Reuters, 2017).
Kenyan ﬂowers imported to the Netherlands have recently been delivered with a combination of
ocean and air transport (Hortiwise, 2013).
One of the main reasons for the use of mixed transportation modes is to cater to customers’
divergent preferences for product quality. Araújo and Garcia (2016, p. 292) reported that the
dominant view of their respondents is that there are well deﬁned segments in the EU mango
market, the largest of which is comprised of “consumers of average purchasing power, who buy
the sea-freighted mangoes,", while another segment is made up of “consumers of the air-freighted
mangoes," which sell for almost three times as much as manoges transported by ship1 The faster
transportation makes the product available in the market at a higher quality but also incurs a
higher shipping cost. As noted in Sangho et al. (2011, p. 14-18), air freighting allows Malian
mangoes to be picked at a more advanced stage of maturity; this translates in an export of
sweeter products but at a signiﬁcantly higher cost;2 shipping mangoes via sea freight instead of
only air, in contrast, enables Malians to export in higher volumes and reach broader markets
as sea freighted mangoes are more cost competitive. Therefore, from the perspective of fruit
exporters, choosing the means of transport is critically important, given the cost diﬀerences
between fast and slow transport modes.
Likewise, in seafood supply chains, sea freight is primarily used for frozen ﬁsh whereas road
or air transport is used mainly to deliver fresh or chilled ﬁsh (Larsen, 2003).3 Customers (e.g.,
restaurants) consider fresh and frozen ﬁsh as vertically diﬀerent products, i.e., fresh ﬁsh is
generally preferred if fresh and frozen ﬁsh sell at the same price;4 ﬁne dining restaurants are
generally more demanding of freshness than fast-food restaurants. In addition, according to
our communications with a Dutch ﬂower company, only a limited portion of ﬂowers is currently
1The distribution channels for the low-end segment includes, for instance, discount markets and neighborhood
greengrocers, whereas the channels for the high-end segment include upscale retailers, restaurants, and gourmet
fruit stores (Araújo and Garcia, 2016; Sangho et al., 2011).
2Exporters from Peru emphasized the high return of air-freighted mangoes as 200% higher than maritime
shipments (Passion Fresh, 2013).
3Examples of seafood exporters selling the product in both frozen and fresh states can be found at http:
//www.vsv.is/en/products-and-marketing/cod and http://en.salva-mar.com/productos/.
4According to a New York Times article (Moskin, 2004), many sushi bars in Japan and elsewhere would use
frozen ﬁsh when fresh ﬁsh is more expensive than what the market can bear.
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transported by ocean because upscale retailers still only accept air-freighted products.
In this paper, we study a company that, like the above examples, exports a perishable
product from its origin and then sells it in a destination market. To transport the product to
its destination, the company (referred to as shipper hereafter) may use multiple transportation
service providers (referred to as carriers hereafter), each operating at diﬀerent speeds and costs.
Furthermore, to attract more payload, carriers competitively oﬀer their freight rates to the
shipper. We aim to answer the following questions: (i) When should a shipper use multiple
shipping modes to serve a vertically diﬀerentiated market? (ii) When carrier competition plays a
role, what are the implications for the shipper’s and carriers’ proﬁts, and especially the shipper’s
sourcing strategies?
To investigate these questions, we analyze a two-stage game involving a perishable-product
shipper, two competing carriers with diﬀerent speeds, and a continuum of utility-maximizing
customers with heterogeneous preferences for product quality. A faster transportation service
enables the product to be supplied with higher quality. First, carriers simultaneously determine
their freight rates. After receiving the carriers’ quotations, the shipper announces two selling
prices, respectively, for shipments delivered by the two carriers. Then, individual customers
decide at which price they want to buy the product. For given freight rates, we derive the
conditions under which the shipper should use a combination of shipping modes such that
shipments via the fast carrier will be sold at a premium price to high-end customers, whereas
shipments via the slow carrier will be used to satisfy customers that are less demanding of quality
Next, we characterize the Nash equilibrium for when carriers competitively determine freight
rates. Among other ﬁndings, we show that the shipper may be better oﬀ when the speed of
the faster carrier decreases: a smaller speed diﬀerence between carriers intensiﬁes competition
and can thus reduce the shipper’s transportation costs in equilibrium. We also ﬁnd that the
shipper’s proﬁt can display a U-shaped curve in the speed diﬀerence between the two carriers,
suggesting that the shipper use carriers with either substantially diﬀerent or very similar speeds
to leverage an operational advantage from product diﬀerentiation or a cost advantage from
carrier competition, respectively.
Moreover, we consider an alternative single sourcing strategy under which carriers are selected
in a winner-take-all fashion. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we prove that restricting to a
single carrier may make the shipper better oﬀ as compared to the dual sourcing strategy. Dual-
mode shipping permits product diﬀerentiation, whereas single sourcing may enable the shipper
to intensify carrier competition and thus leverage more cost advantage when compared to dual
sourcing. Our results suggest that managers assess the trade-oﬀ between the additional cost
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advantage from single sourcing and the operational advantage of product diﬀerentiation. As
our numerical ﬁndings suggest, relative to product diﬀerentiation’s operational advantage, the
additional cost advantage from single sourcing is more attractive when the product has a lower
production cost or a higher potential quality. Additionally, results from our model extensions
help explain how this trade-oﬀ is inﬂuenced by the shape of the customer-type distribution
and the presence of quantity discounts. In particular, we ﬁnd that single sourcing becomes
less attractive as customer types become more homogeneous, as a lower degree of heterogeneity
in the market makes the carrier competition more intense under dual sourcing; in such cases,
single souring may not add much additional cost advantage. Similarly, when carriers compete in
quantity discounts, their competition becomes more intense in general such that single sourcing
yields less additional value compared to our base model in which the two compete in linear rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the model framework and Section 4 presents our results. We explore several
model extensions in Section 5 and conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
Various aspects of transportation procurement have been studied. Lim et al. (2008) examined a
transportation procurement problem in which the shipper allocates freight to ocean carriers on
each route of its network. Sharypova et al. (2012) considered a hinterland supply chain in which
containers are distributed from the deep sea terminal to multiple inland terminals by barge. Hoen
et al. (2013) studied a shipper that determines the inland transport modes and selling prices
for multiple products with consideration for carbon emission. Cheon et al. (2017) developed
an analytical framework to study the impact of the predictability of port processing time on
shippers’ decision-making. Lu et al. (2017) considered a newsvendor-type shipper transporting a
seasonal product whose selling price in the destination market declines over time. They showed
that a portfolio of shipping services can be used to mitigate uncertainties in both demand and
service schedules. Our study diﬀers from the above literature in that we consider freight rates
as endogenous and explore the price competition between carriers.
Our work is relevant to the literature on procurement management that takes delivery time
into consideration. Cachon and Zhang (2006) studied the buyer’s mechanism design problem
when capacity costs are the private information of suppliers. Cachon and Zhang (2007) examined
the role of performance-based demand allocation in incentivizing suppliers to oﬀer fast services.
Bernstein and de Véricourt (2008) considered two suppliers that compete for multiple buyers’
demand by oﬀering service guarantees. These papers focus mainly on production lead times and
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model suppliers based on queueing frameworks. Another related study is Ha et al. (2003) in
which the authors study the supplier competition in delivery frequency and price.
Because shipments can potentially be spread across the selling season in our model, the
shipper in eﬀect provides quality-diﬀerentiated products to a pool of potential buyers with
heterogeneous willingness-to-pay. From this perspective, our paper is relevant to the literature
on product diﬀerentiation (more speciﬁcally, vertical diﬀerentiation). Mussa and Rosen (1978)
and Moorthy (1984) developed a seminal framework for studying product diﬀerentiation in
which a monopolistic ﬁrm determines the quality levels and prices for a menu of products
and customers select the products to maximize their utility. A few subsequent papers have
incorporated supply/production side issues into this classical problem. For example, Desai
et al. (2001) took the manufacturing conﬁguration of products into consideration to explore the
trade-oﬀ between manufacturing cost and sales revenue. Netessine and Taylor (2007) studied the
impact of production technology on product quality diﬀerentiation based on an Economic Order
Quantity framework. Chen et al. (2013) investigated a situation in which the manufacturer
operates a co-product technology that simultaneously outputs quality-diﬀerentiated products.
All of these papers focus primarily on a centralized decision-maker, whereas we consider a shipper
relying on self-interested and competing carriers to supply quality-diﬀerentiated products. While
product diﬀerentiation has been studied under decentralized supply chains (e.g., Villas-Boas,
1998; Lu et al., 2018), our problem diﬀers from theirs in that the (transportation) costs of
products are determined by competing service providers.
Our model features competition between diﬀerentiated carriers, and therefore may relate
to economic literature on diﬀerentiated duopoly/oligopoly. Numerous papers study the price
and/or quantity competition between horizontally diﬀerentiated ﬁrms (e.g., Singh and Vives,
1984; Correa-López, 2007). In particular, Tanaka (2001) studied a vertically diﬀerentiated
duopoly involving two competing ﬁrms of high and low quality, respectively. Our model de-
parts from Tanaka’s (2001) in that the competing ﬁrms in our model are service providers who
oﬀer transportation services to a shipper, rather than making proﬁts directly from the end
market.
Finally, our paper relates to the supply chain management literature concerning dual-sourcing
strategies in the presence of supplier competition. The tension between the operational beneﬁt
of dual sourcing and the eﬀect of carrier competition revealed by our model is reminiscent of
Babich et al. (2007) and Yang et al. (2012) in the supply disruption setting, and Calvo and
Martínez-de Albéniz (2015) in the quick response context. In our shipping problem, however, a
combination of shipping modes is used for product diﬀerentiation.
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3 The Model
We consider a shipper that sends a certain type of short-life-cycle product from the origin to
the customers in an overseas market. As stated in the introduction, a shorter transportation
time makes the product available in the market at a higher quality. We therefore model the
quality as a decreasing function of transportation time, denoted by q(t). For ease of exposition,
we assume that the quality function takes a linear form q(t) = a− t.5 The intercept a represents
the maximum quality that can be potentially supplied to the market if the transportation time
were zero, and it captures other inherit attributes of quality, such as species and brand. Because
this paper focuses on the impact of transportation time on quality, we assume that a is a given
parameter identical for all transported products.
Customers in the destination market have heterogeneous preferences for quality. To model
this heterogeneity, we assume a continuum of inﬁnitesimal customers in the destination with the
market size normalized to one. Customers maximize their utility when making their purchasing
decisions. We use θ ∈ [0, θ¯] to represent a customer’s marginal willingness to pay for quality.
The gross utility of receiving a product with quality q(t) is then given by θq(t) for a customer
with marginal willingness to pay θ. Similar customer setups are used widely in the literature
(e.g., Chen et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2015b). In the base model, we assume that θ is uniformly
distributed within [0, θ¯] where θ¯ is a given parameter measuring the highest possible valuation
among customers. We refer to θ as the customer’s type. The shipper cannot observe each
individual customer’s type but knows the distribution of θ. The uniform distribution together
with inﬁnitesimal customers implicitly presumes that customers’ potential purchasing quantities
are identical. In practice, fruit is sold through diﬀerent channels. Thus, our base model focuses
on channels consisting of small-sized customers (e.g., neighborhood greengrocers, restaurants
and specialized retail stores) whose order quantities are relatively small and not very diﬀerent
from each other. In Section 5.1, we relax the uniform assumption on θ such that diﬀerent types
of customers can demand distinct volumes.
For each unit of product, the shipper incurs a production cost denoted by cp. We will refer to
cp as the production cost throughout the paper with the understanding that it can represent the
procurement cost if the product is purchased from local producers in the origin (e.g., mangoes
purchased from fruit growers). The supply is assumed to be ample at the origin compared to the
potential demand in the overseas market. The shipper owns the product at time of shipment
5In practice, the quality is inﬂuenced by transportation time in various ways. In the example of mango export,
air transport leads to higher quality as compared to ocean shipping, because mangoes can be picked up at a better
stage of maturity (Sangho et al., 2011, p. 14). In the case of seafood, the fast mode of transportation enables
ﬁsh to arrive in the market without having to be frozen. The linear speciﬁcation of q(t) is not essential for the
analysis, and our main results qualitatively hold as long as q(t) is decreasing in t.
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and therefore incurs the inventory holding cost during transportation. The inventory holding
cost for each unit of product and each unit of time is denoted by h.
Two transport service providers, which are referred to as carriers in what follows, are available
from the origin to the destination. Carriers diﬀer in transportation times. Let t = (t1, t2) where
ti is the transportation time of carrier i (i = 1, 2). Without loss of generality, we assume
0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ a throughout the paper. That is, carrier 1 operates a faster service than carrier
2. The ti’s are assumed to be deterministic.6 Carrier i incurs an operating cost ci for shipping
one unit of product. We allow for any nonnegative ci’s in the analysis, even though c1 > c2 is
more probable in practice since t1 < t2. Due to diﬀerent transportation times, the shipper can
deliver the product with quality q(ti) = a − ti via carrier i. Given customers’ heterogeneous
preferences, the shipper’s problem is to determine the selling price of the product shipped by
each transportation service, given the freight rates quoted by the two carriers. Let pi represent
the selling price of the shipment via carrier i. Anticipating the shipper’s decisions, carriers
simultaneously determine their freight rates to be oﬀered to the shipper in a competitive manner
to maximize their own proﬁts. We denote by ri the freight rate quoted by carrier i. Note that
the ti’s are determined by the nature of transportation means and ﬁxed service schedules. Thus,
we consider a game in which carriers compete in the ri’s while the ti’s are given.
The sequence of events is summarized as follows. (1) Carriers decide on the freight rates to
be oﬀered to the shipper. (2) Given freight rates r = (r1, r2) and corresponding transportation
times t = (t1, t2), the shipper determines a price schedule p = (p1, p2). (3) The price schedule
p is announced to overseas customers, according to which the customers make decisions about
when to purchase to maximize their utility. (4) Shipments are made based on the volume
requested by customers and let di(p) denote the demand for the product shipped via carrier
i. The distribution of θ and the values of ci are common knowledge to the shipper and the
carriers.7
In sum, we have a two-stage game-theoretical framework. In the ﬁrst stage, carriers are
engaged in a game of simultaneous pricing. Let r−i represent the freight rates charged by the
competitor of carrier i. For any given r−i, carrier i solves
max
ri
Πci(ri|r−i) = (ri − ci)vi(r), (1)
6The assumption of deterministic transportation times enables us to concentrate on the service diﬀerentiation
in terms of speeds. In practice, transportation times may be uncertain due to disruptions, and this reliability
issue is beyond the scope of this paper but has been studied by Lu et al. (2017).
7For example, fuel consumption costs normally account for a major part of the operating cost for carriers
(Notteboom and Vernimmen, 2009). Hence, the shipper is able to infer ci from public information such as bunker
prices. It is also possible for carriers to estimate the market value of the shipment based on the product. That
said, some level of information asymmetry does exist in practice and deserves further research.
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where vi(r) = di(p∗(r)), representing the shipping volume assigned to carrier i. p∗(r) is the
price schedule chosen optimally by the shipper given a set of freight rates r. Let rN = (rN1 , rN2 )
be the set of freight rates that constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Then, rN satisﬁes
rNi = argmaxri
Πci(ri|rN−i), for all i. (2)
In the second stage, given a set of freight rates r, the shipper determines the optimal selling price
schedule p∗(r) to maximize its proﬁt. We deﬁne wi = cp+ ri+hti for i = 1, 2, which represents
the full variable cost of using carrier i, including the production cost, the shipping cost and
the inventory holding cost during transportation. Note that w = (w1, w2) is inﬂuenced by the
freight rates and is thus endogenously determined by the equilibrium of carrier competition.
Given any w, the shipper’s problem can be written as
max
p
Πs(p) =
2∑
i=1
pidi(p)−
2∑
i=1
widi(p), (3)
The demand function d(p) = (d1(p), d2(p)) can be explicitly derived from the customer utility
function, which is discussed later.
4 Results
4.1 The Optimal Shipping Strategies
We analyze the game backward. We start by deriving the demand function d(p) for any given
price schedule p. Given transportation times t and price schedule p, customers choose from the
two purchasing options characterized by the pairs (q(ti), pi) = (a − ti, pi). Deﬁne t3 = a and
p3 = 0 such that (q(t3), p3) = (0, 0) represents the no-purchase option. Recall that the gross
utility of customers is given by θ(a− ti). As a consequence, a type-θ customer decides when to
buy the product by solving the following problem:
max
i=1,2,3
{θ(a− ti)− pi}.
Given any price schedule p, there is a pair of cutoﬀ points (θ1, θ2) with 0 ≤ θ2 ≤ θ1 ≤ θ¯
such that customers with type θ ∈ (θ1, θ¯] choose to purchase the product with quality a − t1,
those with θ ∈ (θ2, θ1] choose the product with quality a − t2, and all other customers with
θ ∈ [0, θ2] purchase nothing. Moreover, the cutoﬀs (θ1, θ2) have a one-to-one mapping with
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the price schedule p = (p1, p2) through θi =
pi−pi+1
ti+1−ti for i = 1, 2.
8 Consequently, the demand
functions di(p) can be expressed as functions of Θ: d1(Θ) = θ¯− θ1 and d2(Θ) = θ1− θ2. We can
therefore characterize the optimal solution to the shipper’s problem (3) with the optimal cutoﬀ
vector Θ∗ instead of the optimal price schedule p∗ with the understanding of θi =
pi−pi+1
ti+1−ti for
all i. The following proposition characterizes the shipper’s optimal shipping strategy given any
ﬁxed full variables costs. For ease of exposition, we use the shorthand notation Δt = t2− t1 > 0
and γ = a−t1a−t2 > 1, which are frequently used throughout the paper. The proofs of the main
results in this paper are included in the Online Appendix.
Proposition 1. For any given full variable costs w = (w1, w2), the shipper’s optimal cutoﬀs
are given by one of the following cases: (i) if
w1 ≤ w2 + θ¯Δt, (4)
and w1 ≥ γw2, (5)
then use both carriers and θ∗1 =
1
2
(
w1−w2
Δt
+ θ¯
)
and θ∗2 =
1
2
(
w2
a−t2 + θ¯
)
. (ii) if w1 < γw2 and
w1 < θ¯(a− t1), then use only carrier 1 and θ∗1 = θ∗2 = 12
(
w1
a−t1 + θ¯
)
; (iii) if w1 > w2 + θ¯Δt and
w2 < θ¯(a− t2), then use only carrier 2 and θ∗1 = θ¯ and θ∗2 = 12
(
w2
a−t2 + θ¯
)
; (iv) otherwise (i.e.,
when wi ≥ θ¯(a− ti) for all i = 1, 2), ship nothing and θ∗1 = θ∗2 = θ¯;
Cases (i)-(iii) characterize the conditions under which the shipper should use both carriers 1
and 2 (θ¯ > θ∗1 > θ∗2), only carrier 1 (θ¯ > θ∗1 = θ∗2) and only carrier 2 (θ¯ = θ∗1 > θ∗2), respectively.
In case (iv), both variable costs are too high and neither carrier should be used. In particular,
inequalities (4) and (5) characterize the conditions under which dual-mode shipping, i.e., using
both carriers, is optimal.
Graphically, Figure 1 depicts the optimal shipping volumes (v1(w), v2(w)) for any given
full variable costs w. When the full variable cost of carrier i is much more attractive than
that of the other carrier, the shipper would use exclusively carrier i and deliver a volume of
1
2
(
θ¯ − wia−ti
)
with quality a − ti. When neither of the full variable costs is substantially more
attractive than the other, i.e., inequalities (4) and (5) are satisﬁed, the shipper would deliver
a volume of 12
(
θ¯ − w1−w2Δt
)
with quality a − t1 and another volume of 12
(
w1−w2
Δt
− w2a−t2
)
with
quality a − t2. The product in this case will be delivered with diﬀerent qualities, essentially
serving as a product diﬀerentiation strategy.
By the relation θi =
pi−pi+1
ti+1−ti , one can translate Θ
∗ to the optimal price schedule (p∗1, p∗2) that
the shipper should charge at two time points. When the dual-mode is optimal, the optimal prices
8This result has been shown and used in the vertical quality diﬀerentiation literature (e.g., Pan and Honhon,
2012; Chen et al., 2013).
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Figure 1: The optimal shipping volumes for any given full variable costs w = (w1, w2)
are given by p∗i =
1
2
[
wi + θ¯(a− ti)
]
for both i. This may be viewed as a markup pricing policy.
The selling price of the shipment via carrier i is calculated based only on variable cost wi and
transportation time ti. Moreover, the markup term θ¯(a− ti) is higher for the shipment supplied
via carrier 1, which can be interpreted as a price “premium” for the high-quality product. Under
dual-mode shipping, the ﬁrst shipment via carrier 1 is delivered faster and sells at a higher price,
whereas the second shipment via carrier 2 reaches the market more slowly and has a lower selling
price; but the slow shipment allows the shipper to capture market segments in which customers
are not particularly sensitive to delivery time. This result appears consistent with the earlier
quoted anecdotal evidence: When mangoes are shipped from Mali via sea freight instead of only
air freight, Malians were able to export in higher volumes and reach broader markets instead
of only the current niche market, as sea-freighted mangoes are more cost competitive (Sangho
et al., 2011, p. 18).
4.2 Characterization of the Nash Equilibrium
Having analyzed the shipper’s optimal decision, we proceed to analyze price competition between
carriers. To begin, we deﬁne woi = ci + hti + cp which represents the minimum full variable cost
of using carrier i, as it equals the full variable cost for the shipper when carrier i charges its
marginal cost. In some sense, the lower woi is, the higher carrier i’s cost eﬃciency. We assume
woi ∈ [0, θ¯(a−ti)] for all i without loss of generality, because by Proposition 4, if woi ≥ θ¯(a−ti) for
some i, then regardless of the competitor’s quote, carrier i cannot obtain any business even when
its freight rate ri is equal to the marginal operating cost ci. Recall that carriers simultaneously
determine their freight rates while anticipating the shipper’s optimal responses, as characterized
in Section 4.1. Because cp, h and ti are given parameters, optimizing over ri ≥ ci is equivalent
to optimizing over the full variable cost wi = ri+hti+cp ≥ woi for carrier i. We can thus rewrite
10
carrier i’s problem (1) as the following.
max
wi≥woi
Πci(wi|w−i) = (wi − woi )vi(w), (6)
By solving Problem (6), we can characterize each carrier’s best response function in closed form,
which is detailed in Proposition B.1 (see Appendix B).
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Figure 2: Illustration of possible Nash equilibria
In Theorem 1, we show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in the carrier competition,
and the equilibrium freight rates (expressed with w) are derived in closed form.
Theorem 1. In price competition between carriers, there is a unique Nash equilibrium (wN1 , w
N
2 )
given by one of the following ﬁve cases:
(i) If wo1 ≤ 2γwo2 − θ¯(a− t1), then
(NE1) wN1 =
wo1 + θ¯(a− t1)
2
, wN2 = w
o
2.
(ii) If 2γwo2 − θ¯(a− t1) < wo1 ≤ (2γ − 1)wo2 − θ¯Δt, then
(NE2) wN1 = γw
o
2, w
N
2 = w
o
2.
(iii) If (2γ − 1)wo2 − θ¯Δt < wo1 ≤ γw
o
2+2γθ¯Δt
2γ−1 , then
(NE3) wN1 =
2γwo1 + γw
o
2 + 2γθ¯Δt
4γ − 1 , w
N
2 =
wo1 + 2γw
o
2 + θ¯Δt
4γ − 1 . (7)
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(iv) If γw
o
2+2γθ¯Δt
2γ−1 < w
o
1 ≤ w
o
2+(2γ−1)θ¯(a−t2)
2 , then
(NE4) wN1 = w
o
1, w
N
2 = w
o
1 − θ¯Δt.
(v) If wo1 >
wo2+(2γ−1)θ¯(a−t2)
2 , then
(NE5) wN1 = w
o
1, w
N
2 =
wo2 + θ¯(a− t2)
2
.
“NE” in the theorem is short for the Nash equilibrium. The shipper only uses carrier 1 in
NE1 and NE2. The diﬀerence between NE1 and NE2 is that in NE1, carrier 1 can charge a
monopolistic price as if its competitor were not present, whereas in NE2 carrier 1 retains all of
the business but competition from carrier 2 brings its freight rate down from monopoly. Likewise,
the shipper exclusively uses carrier 2 in NE4 and NE5, and carrier 2 charges a monopolistic price
in NE5 but is unable to do so in NE4. In NE3, neither carrier can win the entire business and
the shipper adopts a dual-mode shipping strategy that leads to product diﬀerentiation in the
destination market.9
To take a ﬁrst glimpse of the implications of carrier competition, let us imagine a setting
where the three parties (the shipper and two carriers) are governed by a central planner. In such
a scenario, one can regard the operating costs c1 and c2 as the freight rates quoted by carriers 1
and 2. From Proposition 1, it can be seen that in this centralized setting, dual-mode shipping
is never optimal if the faster carrier operates at a lower cost, i.e., c1 < c2. However, this is not
true when carriers compete and strategically decide on the freight rates.
Proposition 2. The shipper may use both carriers in the Nash equilibrium even when c1 < c2.
As shown in Proposition 2, even when the slower carrier operates at a higher cost, it may still
receive some business in equilibrium. In other words, the carrier competition makes the shipper
more likely to use dual-mode shipping. From the customers’ perspective, this suggests that
carrier competition may increase the variety of products supplied in the end market.
4.3 The Eﬀect of Transportation Times
As established in Proposition B.5 of Appendix B, if freight rates are given, then the shipper’s
proﬁt always decreases as either carrier slows down. Nevertheless, in this subsection, we show
that the shipper’s proﬁt may not be monotonic in the fast carrier’s speed when freight rates
9To implement the threatening strategies in NE2 and NE4 in reality, the shipper may invite both carriers to
bid.
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are an equilibrium outcome of the carrier competition. In what follows, we focus on the dual-
mode shipping equilibrium, i.e., NE3 as stated in Theorem 1. Proposition 3 presents a set of
comparative static results on the shipper’s variable costs wNi ’s and proﬁt Π
N
s = Πs(w
N ). The
terms increasing and decreasing are used in the weak sense throughout the paper.
Proposition 3. If dual-mode shipping is adopted in equilibrium, then the following statements
hold true: (i) If 2w
o
1+w
o
2
a−t2 ≤ min{
3θ¯−(4γ−1)h
2 , 2θ¯(4γ
2 − 2γ + 1) − (8γ2 − 2γ)h}, both wN1 and wN2
are decreasing in t1; if h ≤ θ¯/2, wN1 is always decreasing in t1; if h = 0 and c1 = c2, there exists
a γˆ > 1 such that ΠNs is increasing in t1 for all 1 < γ ≤ γˆ; (ii) wN1 is always increasing in t2; if
4wo1+2w
o
2
a−t2 ≤ (8γ− 2)h+ θ¯(8− 1γ − 4γ), wN2 is also increasing in t2, and so ΠNs is decreasing in t2.
Part (i) of Proposition 3 shows that as t1 increases, both variable costs for the shipper can
be lower in equilibrium, given that inventory holding cost h is small or the highest market
valuation θ¯ is large. The key driver for these results is that a smaller gap between t1 and t2
makes carrier competition more intense and thus reduces the freight rates in equilibrium. As
long as h ≤ θ¯210, a greater t1 always lowers wN1 . It can be shown that the shipper’s proﬁt
function Πs(w) for any ﬁxed wi’s is decreasing in all ti’s and wi’s (see Proposition B.5). Hence,
there are two countervailing forces that determine the aggregate eﬀect of t1 on the shipper’s
proﬁt: An increase in t1 always results in operational ineﬃciency, but it can also create a cost
advantage due to lower freight rates in equilibrium. While it is intractable to fully characterize
this aggregate eﬀect, part (i) of Proposition 3 establishes that in the special case in which the
inventory holding cost is zero and carriers’ operating costs are not equal, the shipper’s proﬁt
ΠNs is increasing in t1 when t1 and t2 are suﬃciently close. This demonstrates that the cost
advantage due to carrier competition may outweigh operational eﬃciency.
However, an increase in t2 reduces operational eﬃciency. It also enlarges the gap between t1
and t2, thus weakening the intensity of competition and reducing the shipper’s cost advantage.
As indicated by part (ii) of Proposition 3, carrier 1 always raises its freight rate as t2 increases.
We also provide the condition11 under which an increase in t2 also makes wN2 higher and conse-
quently lowers the shipper’s proﬁt. If this condition does not hold, while wN2 can be decreasing
in t2, all of our numerical experiments suggest that an increase in t2 still lowers the shipper’s
proﬁt as an aggregate eﬀect.
Next, we report a numerical study to investigate the aggregate eﬀect of transportation times
10This is a very mild condition, implying that for one unit reduction of transportation time, the average increase
in customers’ utility is greater than the inventory holding cost.
11To interpret the condition, assuming h = 0, one can show that the right-hand side of the inequality is
decreasing in γ. This implies that for a relatively high θ¯, the inequality holds if and only if γ is smaller than a
threshold. In other words, carrier 2 can possibly raise its freight rate as it becomes slower when t1 and t2 are
close enough and the maximum market valuation is relatively high.
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Figure 3: Impact of t1 on the shipper’s proﬁt (with t2 = 3)
on the shipper’s proﬁt in more general cases. As mentioned earlier, we observed in all of our
numerical instances that the shipper is worse oﬀ as t2 increases. We therefore focus on the eﬀect
of t1 in what follows. In the numerical study, we assume the inventory holding cost h = ιcp where
ι represents the interest rate used in the calculation of h. Having proved that the shipper’s proﬁt
may increase with t1 as the cost advantage due to competition dominates operational eﬃciency
when t1 is close to t2, we can further infer that the eﬀect of t1 should be reversed when t1 is
much smaller than t2; in such cases, carrier competition is reduced and the operational eﬃciency
becomes dominant. This reasoning is veriﬁed in Figure 3 which shows that the shipper’s proﬁt
is U-shaped with respect to t1. In Figure 3, t1 varies from 0.1 to 2.9 with t2 being ﬁxed at
3.12 With diﬀerent values of θ¯, cp and ι as indicated, we ﬁnd that the shipper’s U-shaped proﬁt
becomes more downward sloping when θ¯ is lower or ι are higher, indicating that sourcing from
similar services (in terms of speed) brings more beneﬁt in a market with higher valuation and
heterogeneity, or when the product is procured and held as inventory at a lower cost. Intuitively,
a higher inventory holding cost makes the two carriers more distinct from each other because of
the pipeline inventory, thus weakening the competition eﬀect in some sense.
As for the inﬂuence of transportation times on each carrier’s proﬁt, one might anticipate that
an individual carrier is worse oﬀ having a faster competitor. However, this is not necessarily
true. In Figure 4, we plot freight rates rNi , shipping volumes v
N
i and carriers’ proﬁts Π
N
ci in
equilibrium as either t1 or t2 varies.13 As shown in Figure 4(a), when carrier 1 speeds up, i.e., t1
becomes smaller, carrier 2 may raise its freight rate, which echoes our analytical ﬁnding in part
(i) of Proposition 3 and improves its proﬁt. In other words, the slow carrier may be a free rider
as its competitor speeds up further, as more distinct transportation times reduce competition.
In contrast, we also observed that carrier 1 is always worse oﬀ slowing down its service. Figure
4(b) shows that as t2 increases, both carriers may increase freight rates, as indicated by part
12The other parameters are set as a = 10, c1 = 10 and c2 = 2.
13In the numerical examples in Figure 4, θ¯ = 40, cp = 20, ι = 0.01, a = 10, c1 = 10 and c2 = 2.
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Figure 4: Impact of the transportation times on freight rates, shipping volumes and carriers’
proﬁts
(ii) of Proposition 3. Moreover, carrier 2 may improve its proﬁt by reducing its speed and
distinguishing itself from the competitor, but the beneﬁt of slowing down can be dominated by
the operational ineﬃciency when t2 drops too much. Another interesting observation is that
while carrier 1 is always better oﬀ as t2 increases, it may receive a smaller volume vN1 as its
competitor becomes slower.
To recap our main ﬁndings, the shipper’s proﬁt is U-shaped in the diﬀerence between the
speeds of two carriers due to a tension between operational eﬃciency and cost advantage. The
U-shaped proﬁt curve suggests that under dual-mode shipping, the shipper should use two
carriers with either substantially distinct or very similar speeds to leverage either the operational
advantage or the cost advantage. Using two moderately diﬀerent services may be harmful. From
the slow carrier’s perspective, it is sometimes beneﬁcial to have a faster competitor or to further
slow itself down. This ﬁnding has implications on the recent practice of slow steaming in ocean
transport (e.g., Lee et al., 2015a). In addition to cost reduction, ocean liners can potentially
beneﬁt from slow steaming to diﬀerentiate themselves from faster competitors (e.g., airline or
rail).
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4.4 Single Sourcing vs. Dual Sourcing
In the base model, we presumed a procurement strategy whereby the shipper allows the possi-
bility of dual-mode shipping and both carriers are informed of this possibility at the beginning
of the game. We will refer to this strategy, i.e., the game setup that we have analyzed so far, as
the dual-sourcing strategy. Note that we make a distinction between the two terms, dual-mode
shipping and dual sourcing. Under a dual sourcing strategy, the shipper may end up using either
one or two carriers, depending on which of the Nash equilibria characterized in Theorem 1 is
reached.
In this subsection, we consider an alternative procurement strategy, the single-sourcing strat-
egy, deﬁned as follows. The shipper restricts itself to a single shipping service, and carriers are
aware that they will be selected in a winner-take-all fashion. Under this single-sourcing strategy,
the carrier that is not chosen will lose out on the entire business; as such, carriers will be engaged
in a Bertrand-type competition and the winner will set its price such that the competitor ﬁnds
it unproﬁtable to compete for the business. Proposition B.2 in Appendix B details the charac-
terization of the Nash equilibrium, denoted by (wS1 , wS2 ), under the single-sourcing strategy. In
the following discussion, we denote by ΠSs the shipper’s proﬁt in the single-sourcing equilibrium
and it can be shown that ΠSs = maxi
[θ¯(a−ti)−wSi ]2
4θ¯(a−ti) . Note that if freight rates are exogenously
given, then single sourcing can never perform better than dual sourcing, as it restricts the feasi-
ble region of the shipper’s problem. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, single sourcing may
outperform dual sourcing when carriers competitively determine their freight rates.
We are particularly interested in the question of whether the shipper is better oﬀ with single
sourcing when dual-mode shipping is indeed an equilibrium in our base model. We deﬁne a set
Ωd = {(wo1, wo2) ∈ R2+ : wL1 (wo2) ≤ wo1 ≤ wU1 (wo2)} where wL1 (wo2) = max{(2γ−1)wo2− θ¯Δt, 0} and
wU1 (w
o
2) =
γwo2+2γθ¯Δt
2γ−1 . By Theorem 1, the set Ω
d consists of all possible (wo1, wo2) that lead to
NE3, i.e., dual-mode shipping, in Theorem 1. The following theorem proves that single sourcing
outperforms dual sourcing if and only if (wo1, wo2) falls in a middle region of Ωd.
Theorem 2. For any (wo1, w
o
2) ∈ Ωd with wo2 being ﬁxed, there exist two thresholds φ(wo2) ≤ φ¯(wo2)
within [wL1 (w
o
2), w
U
1 (w
o
2)] such that (i) Π
S
s ≥ ΠNs if wo1 ∈
[
φ(wo2), φ¯(w
o
2)
]
and (ii) ΠSs ≤ ΠNs if
wo1 ∈
[
wL1 (w
o
2), φ(w
o
2)
) ∪ (φ¯(wo2), wU1 (wo2)].
Figure 5(a) visualizes Theorem 2 with a speciﬁc example14 in which the thresholds’ depen-
dence on wo2 is omitted for brevity. In particular, the kink point of ΠSs in the middle, which
occurs at wo1 = wP1 , is attained when single sourcing gives rise to a “perfect” or, in other words,
14In the example of Figures 5(a) and 5(b), θ¯ = 50, t1 = 3, t2 = 6, a = 10. In particular, wo2 is ﬁxed at 100 in
Figure 5(a).
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Figure 5: Comparison between the proﬁts under single sourcing and dual sourcing
the most intense competition in the sense that both carriers price at their marginal costs (see
Proposition B.3 in Appendix B for a closed-form expression of wP1 ). Single sourcing may there-
fore trigger more intense competition as compared to dual sourcing, which enables the shipper to
better leverage the cost advantage from carrier competition especially when wo1 is in the vicinity
of wP1 . However, being restricted to a single carrier, the shipper has to sacriﬁce the value of
product diﬀerentiation. Our analysis shows that the shipper may be better oﬀ forgoing product
diﬀerentiation and instead taking full advantage of carrier competition via single sourcing. Theo-
rem 2 uncovers this underlying trade-oﬀ between product diﬀerentiation and carrier competition
exploitation. Figure 5(b)15 presents a full picture of the comparison between the two sourcing
strategies for all pairs of (wo1, wo2), including those not in Ωd. In Appendix B, Proposition B.4
establishes that for (wo1, wo2) /∈ Ωd, single sourcing is weakly dominated by dual sourcing.16
From Theorem 2, we can readily conclude a similar result in terms of carriers’ operating
costs ci’s: For any ﬁxed c2, there exist two thresholds cL1 and cU1 such that single sourcing is
preferred if and only if c1 lies in the interval [cL1 , cU1 ]. To investigate how other parameters
shape the boundary conditions between the two sourcing strategies, we conduct a numerical
study as shown in Figure 6. In Figures 6(a) and 6(c), we consider a case in which two carriers
have identical operating costs (Δc = c1 − c2 = 0). Single sourcing tends to be preferable when
Δt = t2 − t1 is smaller such that the competition induced by winner-take-all is closer to perfect
(given equal operating costs). A smaller production cost cp makes single sourcing more likely to
be favored (Figure 6(a)), because, intuitively, when cp becomes larger, the transportation cost
15In the examples given in Figure 6, c2 = 2, c1 = c2 +Δc, t1 = 1, t2 = t1 +Δt, h = 0.01cp.
16When one dominant carrier can attract all of the shipments even under the dual sourcing strategy, single
sourcing does not intensify the competition but instead endows the dominant carrier with greater pricing power
(regions (b) and (f) in Figure 5(b)). Moreover, if the diﬀerence between woi ’s is extreme, then the dominant
carrier can price as a monopoly such that the shipper is indiﬀerent between single sourcing and dual sourcing
(regions (a) and (g) in Figure 5(b)).
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Figure 6: Impacts of Δt, Δc, cp, a on the procurement strategies
will account for a smaller portion in the full variable cost wi = ri+hti+ cp (where h = 0.01cp in
the numerical example); consequently, this will lessen the additional cost advantage derived from
single sourcing. As the potential quality level a increases, the transportation-induced quality
diﬀerentiation becomes less salient, thus lowering the value of dual sourcing. Hence, single
sourcing becomes more favorable when the product has a higher potential quality a (Figure
6(c)). When c1 and c2 diﬀerent, as shown in Figures 6(b) and 6(d), an increase in Δt may
either strengthen or weaken the value of single sourcing, depending on the extent to which Δt
is aligned with Δc.
5 Extensions
5.1 Non-uniform Customer Type Distribution
Our base model assumed that customer type θ is uniformly distributed. This implies that
customers in the market demand similar volumes. In practice, a fruit exporter may sell to
big supermarket chains whose purchasing quantities are often larger than other channels such
as gourmet stores and neighborhood groceries. To incorporate this more realistic situation in
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which customers of diﬀerent types may demand distinct volumes, we now relax the assumption
that customer type θ is uniformly distributed. We assume that θ is distributed according to a
cumulative distribution function (cdf) F (θ) on a support of [θ, θ¯]. Let f(θ) be the probability
density function and F¯ (θ) = 1 − F (θ). The density f(θ) can be interpreted as the demand
volume of a customer with type θ; customers vary in demand volume if distribution F (θ) is
not uniform. Throughout this subsection, we assume F (θ) has an increasing failure rate (IFR),
which is satisﬁed by many common probability distributions (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005). Let
G(θ) = θ− F¯ (θ)f(θ) and Gˆ−1(x) = G−1(max{x,G(θ)}).17 We ﬁrst show that for given freight rates,
the shipper’s optimal shipping strategy has the same structure as characterized in Proposition
1.
Proposition 4. Given any (w1, w2), the optimal shipping strategy and cutoﬀs Θ∗ = (θ∗1, θ∗2) are
given by one of the following cases: (i) if w1 ≤ w2+θ¯Δt and w1 ≥ γw2, then use both carriers and
θ∗1 = Gˆ−1(
w1−w2
Δt
) and θ∗2 = Gˆ−1(
w2
a−t2 ). (ii) if w1 < γw2 and w1 < θ¯(a−t1), then exclusively use
carrier 1 and θ∗1 = θ∗2 = Gˆ−1(
w1
a−t1 ); (iii) if w1 > w2 + θ¯Δt and w2 < θ¯(a− t2), then exclusively
use carrier 2 and θ∗1 = θ¯ and θ∗2 = Gˆ−1(
w2
a−t2 ); (iv) otherwise (i.e., when wi ≥ θ¯(a − ti) for all
i = 1, 2), then ship nothing and θ∗1 = θ∗2 = θ¯.
Next, we establish the log-supermodularity of the generalized carrier competition under the
following regularity condition on distribution F :
(R): f(θ) is (weakly) decreasing, and
f ′(θ)F¯ (θ)
(f(θ))2
is (weakly) increasing.
Condition (R) requires a decreasing density function. In other words, demand in lower-end
segments is larger, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence that the largest segments are
comprised of buyers with average purchasing power, e.g., buying sea-freighted mangoes in the EU
market (Araújo and Garcia, 2016). In the Supplementary Material for the paper, we have veriﬁed
that condition (R) is satisﬁed by the uniform distribution, (truncated) exponential distribution,
triangular distribution with decreasing density, power distribution F (θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)b with
b ≥ 1, and (truncated) Weibull distribution F (θ) = 1− e−( xλ )k with k ≤ 1.
Theorem 3. Under condition (R), carrier i’s proﬁt function Πci(w1, w2) is log-supermodular in
(w1, w2) for all i. The carrier competition has a Nash equilibrium and the set of Nash equilibria
is a lattice containing a pair of lowest quotations (wN1 , w
N
2 ) and a pair of highest ones (w¯
N
1 , w¯
N
2 ).
Theorem 3 proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium under condition (R). Furthermore, it
implies that the component-wise smallest and largest equilibria, (wN1 , wN2 ) and (w¯N1 , w¯N2 ), can
17By the IFR of F , G(θ) is strictly increasing in θ and its inverse function G−1 is thus well deﬁned.
19
be eﬃciently computed with a round-robin scheme (see Section 4.3 in Topkis, 1998, for details).
If (wN1 , wN2 ) and (w¯N1 , w¯N2 ) are identical, then the game has a unique equilibrium. This enables
us to conduct an extensive numerical study with more general customer type distributions.
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Figure 7: Numerical results when F (θ) = 1− (1− θ)b and θ ∈ [0, 1] (cp = 0.4)
First, we consider a power distribution F (θ) = 1−(1−θ)b where θ ∈ [0, 1]. This coincides with
a uniform distribution when b = 1, and as b increases, higher-end customers have less demand.18
We computed in total 1260 instances in which b varies from 1 to 3 with an increment of 0.1, t1
varies from 0.1 to 2.9 with an increment of 0.2, cp varies from 0.2 to 0.8 with an increment of
0.2, and other parameters are set as c1 = 0.2, c2 = 0.02, a = 10, t2 = 3, h = 0.01cp. We did
not observe multiple equilibria in any tested instances. Figure 7 reports several representative
instances. Figure 7(a) indicates that as demand grows among the low-end customer segments,
the equilibrium freight rates drop, a larger portion of shipments shift to the slow carrier, and
the two carriers’ payoﬀs decline. This implies that a larger b makes carrier competition more
intense under the dual sourcing strategy. Consequently, as b increases, the advantage of single
sourcing relative to dual sourcing is weakened and thus single sourcing becomes less favorable
(see Figure 7(c)). However, our main results continue to hold when θ is not uniformly distributed:
18We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we explore this distribution.
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Single sourcing can still be superior to dual sourcing in many instances (Figure 7(c)) and the
shipper’s proﬁt can still be U-shaped in t1 (Figure 7(b)). The U-shaped curve becomes ﬂatter
as b increases, because given a very large b, most demand belongs to the low end and this leaves
little room for quality diﬀerentiation, thereby making the competition quite ﬁerce irrespective
of the gap between t1 and t2. Besides the results presented in Figure 7, we also observed that
carrier 2 can be better oﬀ as carrier 1 speeds up for any ﬁxed value of b, indicating that our main
ﬁndings from carriers’ perspective are robust under more general customer-type distributions.
In addition, we conducted two more sets of numerical experiments, ﬁrst when θ follows a
uniform distribution with a positive lower limit θ, and second a triangular distribution with
decreasing density. We found that similar to the rationale discussed above, single sourcing
becomes less attractive as θ increases. The additional numerical results are reported in Appendix
S2 of the Supplementary Material.
5.2 Setup Cost
In the base model, we have ignored the shipper’s setup cost for arranging an additional shipment.
Suppose now that the shipper incurs an internal setup cost K if an additional carrier is used.
Carriers compete in freight rates ri’s, or equivalently, the wi’s in the base model. Intuitively, two
carriers are simultaneously used only if the setup cost K can be justiﬁed by the value of product
diﬀerentiation. Given any full variable costs, the shipper’s optimal cutoﬀs are characterized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 5. For any given (w1, w2), the shipper’s optimal shipping strategies are given by
one of the following cases: (i) if
w1 + 2
√
θ¯ΔtK < w2 + θ¯Δt, (8)
w1 > γw2 + 2
√
γθ¯ΔtK, (9)
then use both carriers and θ∗1 =
1
2
(
θ¯ + w1−w2Δt
)
and θ∗2 =
1
2
(
θ¯ + w2a−t2
)
; (ii) otherwise, exclusively
use carrier 1 (resp. carrier 2) and θ∗1 = θ∗2 =
1
2
(
θ¯ + w1a−t1
)
(resp. θ∗1 = θ¯ and θ∗2 =
1
2
(
θ¯ + w2a−t2
)
)
if w1√
a−t1 − θ¯
√
a− t1 ≤ (resp. >) w2√a−t2 − θ¯
√
a− t2.
Inequalities (8) and (9) provide the conditions under which dual-mode shipping is optimal
in the presence of a setup cost K. When K = 0, inequalities (8) and (9) reduces to the previous
conditions (4) and (5) in our base model. The set of wi’s satisfying inequalities (8) and
(9) shrinks as K increases, implying that a higher setup cost makes dual-mode shipping less
attractive.
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The following proposition shows that the main results regarding the Nash equilibrium in our
base model remain valid, but that the condition for dual-mode shipping is adapted to (10).
Proposition 6. Suppose that the shipper incurs a setup cost K for using an additional carrier
and adopts a dual-sourcing strategy as in the base model. There is a unique Nash equilibrium in
the pricing game between carriers. Moreover, in equilibrium, the shipper uses both carriers with
quotations (wN1 , w
N
2 ) given by (7) if and only if
(2γ − 1)wo2 − θ¯Δt + (8γ − 2)
√
Kθ¯Δt
γ
< wo1 <
γ
2γ − 1w
o
2 +
2γ
2γ − 1 θ¯Δt −
8γ − 2
2γ − 1
√
Kθ¯Δt. (10)
Moreover, dual-mode shipping is a possible equilibrium for some (wo1, w
o
2) if and only if K ≤
γ(γ−1)(θ¯(a−t2)−wo2)
2
4(2γ+
√
γ−1)2θ¯(a−t2) .
The shipper’s proﬁt function under dual-mode shipping will remain as it was before, with the
exception that a constant setup cost is subtracted. Therefore, the eﬀects of t1 and t2 described
in Section 4.3 are intact as long as condition (10) is satisﬁed. Also, Theorem 6 shows that the
shipper may possibly use both carriers in equilibrium given that the setup cost does not exceed
a certain threshold. In practice, logistics service providers that specialize in perishable-product
cargo often provide door-to-door delivery service19. In many cases, then, the setup cost would
not be prohibitive. In addition, our analysis in Section 4.4 reveals that even without setup costs,
the shipper may be better oﬀ with single sourcing instead of dual sourcing because of the cost
advantage due to carrier competition. This key insight will not change in the presence of setup
costs.
5.3 Quantity Discounts
Thus far, we have assumed that carriers use linear pricing. Now, we check the robustness of our
results by allowing carriers to compete in nonlinear pricing schemes. Speciﬁcally, we assume the
discounted freight rate for one unit of shipment by carrier i to be given by a linear form ri−βivi
if the shipping volume via carrier i equals vi, where ri is the regular rate and βi represents the
discount factor. This speciﬁcation is in line with Lee et al. (2015b) in which the authors also
studied a pricing problem in the freight transport industry. To rule out unreasonable discount
schemes, we assume that the total payment to carrier i (i.e., (ri − βivi)vi) is nondecreasing
in vi, or equivalently, ri ≥ 2βi. The game setup remains as before except that each carrier i
simultaneously determines ri and βi and the shipper optimizes its shipping strategy based on
19See, for example, http://www.transitfruits-eagle.com/en/door-door-transit and http://www.lynden.
com/logistics/seafood.html.
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both (ri, βi)’s. As before, we deﬁne wi = ri+hti+ cp and assume wi < θ¯(a− ti) for all i without
loss of generality (otherwise, carrier i will receive no shipments even when it is the only option
for the shipper).
The following proposition characterizes the shipper’s optimal strategy given any discount
schemes where B(β) = θ¯(a− t2)β1 + θ¯(a− t1)β2 − β1β2 − θ¯2(a− t2)(t2 − t1).
Proposition 7. For any given (w1, β1) and (w2, β2), the shipper’s optimal shipping strategies
are given by one of the following cases: (i) If B(β) < 0 and
w1 < w2 + θ¯Δt −
(
γ − w2
θ¯(a− t2)
)
β2, (11)
w1 > γw2 +
(
1− w2
θ¯(a− t2)
)
β1, (12)
then using both carriers is optimal and θ∗1 = θD1 and θ∗2 = θD2 where θD1 =
θ¯[B(β)−θ¯(a−t2)(w1−w2−β1)+β2(w1−β1)]
2B(β)
and θD2 =
θ¯2(a−t2)+θ¯w2−2β2θD1
2(θ¯(a−t2)−β2) ; (ii) otherwise, it is optimal to exclusively use carrier i where i
is chosen as i∗ = argmaxi=1,2
(wi−θ¯(a−ti))2
4(θ¯(a−ti)−βi) ; moreover, θ
∗
1 = θ
∗
2 = θ
S
1 if i
∗ = 1 and θ∗1 = θ¯ and
θ∗2 = θS2 if i∗ = 2, where θSi =
θ¯(θ¯(a−ti)−2βi+wi)
2(θ¯(a−ti)−βi) for i = 1, 2.
As compared to our base model, the conditions under which dual-mode shipping is optimal
become more stringent in the presence of quantity discounts. Note that by assumption B(β) is
increasing in both β1 and β2.20 Based on Proposition 7, given the competitor’s discount scheme
(w−i, β−i), carrier i’s best response is determined by comparing two possible strategies: (i) share
the business with its competitor with a relatively small discount factor βi such that B(β) < 0 or
(ii) win over the entire business by imposing a large enough discount factor βi. The shipper may
thus adopt either single-mode or dual-mode shipping in equilibrium. Propositions C.1 and C.2
in Appendix C provide necessary conditions for either case to be an equilibrium. Based on these
conditions, we developed an algorithm to numerically ﬁnd the dual-mode shipping equilibrium
if it exists (see Algorithm 1 in Appendix C).
Intuitively, quantity discounts give each carrier an extra device to compete with each other,
which in turn intensiﬁes competition and yields greater cost advantages for the shipper. As
reported in Figures 8(a) and 8(b), which plot the proﬁts of both the shipper and the carriers
with and without quantity discounts,21 quantity discounts make the shipper better oﬀ but make
20 ∂B(β)
∂βi
= θ¯(a − t−i) − β−i > 0, because the assumptions wi < θ¯(a − ti) and ri ≥ 2βi together imply that
θ¯(a− ti) > ri ≥ βi for all i.
21Parameters used in Figure 8 are θ ∼ U [0, 1], a = 10, c1 = 0.4, c2 = 0.02, cp = 0.1, h− 0.01cp. In Figure 8(a),
t1 was varied from 1 to 2.6 with stepsize of 0.1. Our algorithm generated a unique equilibrium until t1 ≤ 2.6,
implying that no dual-mode shipping equilibrium exists for t1 ≥ 2.7 because carrier 2 would be used exclusively.
We also tested a few instances with diﬀerent values of cp; the results are similar.
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Figure 8: Impact of quantity discounts (QD) on the shipper’s and carriers’ proﬁts (t2 = 3, only
dual-mode shipping equilibria plotted)
the carriers worse oﬀ, all else being equal. In particular, Figure 8(a) indicates that the shipper’s
proﬁt curve can still be U-shaped under quantity discounts but that the shape becomes much
ﬂatter and more downward sloping. This is because under quantity discounts, the beneﬁt from
carrier competition is already substantial even when t1 is small.
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Figure 9: Impact of quantity discounts on the sourcing strategies
One might anticipate that quantity discounts discourage dual sourcing. However, Figure 9
shows that dual sourcing is more favorable under quantity discounts.22 Quantity discounts make
carrier competition under dual sourcing already quite intense and therefore any additional cost
advantage generated by single sourcing may no longer justify the loss of operational advantage
from dual sourcing.
22The Nash equilibrium under single sourcing is characterized in Proposition C.3.
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6 Conclusions
This paper studies a transportation procurement problem involving a perishable-product ship-
per, two competing carriers and a destination market consisting of heterogeneous customers.
Our analysis provides answers to the research questions raised in the introduction:
• When should a shipper use multiple shipping modes to serve a vertically diﬀerentiated
market? Given freight rates, the shipper beneﬁts from dual-mode shipping if it can yield
a higher proﬁt margin by using the faster service and fulﬁll the needs of more customers
who have less demanding quality preferences by using the slower service. To some extent,
this result is consistent with several empirical observations. Being shipped via sea instead
of only air freight, Malian mangoes can reach broader market segments in the EU (Sangho
et al., 2011, p. 18). By contrast, mango exporters from Peru emphasize the high return
of air-freighted mangoes (Passion Fresh, 2013).
• When carrier competition plays a role, what are the implications for the shipper’s sourc-
ing strategies and the proﬁts of both the shipper and the carriers? Because of the cost
advantages from carrier competition, we ﬁnd that the shipper’s proﬁt can be U-shaped in
the gap between the speeds of two carriers, suggesting that the shipper should contract
with the carriers with either considerably distinct or very similar services. From the car-
rier’s perspective, our results imply that when a ﬁrm is competing with a faster rival, it
may be better oﬀ strategically by slowing down its service further. Furthermore, while
intuition might suggest that restricting shipments to a single carrier is always suboptimal
compared to dual-sourcing strategies, we found that this not to be true when carriers
compete; rather, single sourcing may be more beneﬁcial to the shipper than dual sourcing
because it intensiﬁes carrier competition. However, while dual sourcing permits product
diﬀerentiation, it can lower the cost advantage from carrier competition (as compared to
single sourcing). For this reason, product diﬀerentiation, despite receiving strong praises
in the revenue management and marketing literature, could potentially hurt the shipper.
We generalized our base model in three ways. First, by showing the log-supermodularity of
the carrier game under certain regularity conditions, we numerically veriﬁed the robustness of
our main results under various customer-type distributions. Second, when the shipper incurs a
setup cost for sourcing from an additional carrier, our results for dual-mode shipping remain valid
as long as the setup cost does not exceed an upper threshold. Third, allowing carriers to oﬀer
quantity discounts instead of only linear freight rates, we found that carrier competition becomes
more intense (than under linear freight rates) under the dual-sourcing strategy; consequently,
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the value of single sourcing relative to dual sourcing is weakened under quantity discounts.
Our work has limitations that point to directions for future research. There are other metrics
in fruit quality that are not captured in our model. Araújo and Garcia (2016) mentioned that
the market can also be segmented for organic and nonorganic mangoes. One could interpret
the shipper in our model as a non-organic fruit exporter. In reality, there could be organic
fruit exporters competing with nonorganic suppliers for the overall demand. To some extent,
this can be captured in our model by introducing a positive outside option for customers. If
customers value the organic option equally, the outside option can then be normalized to zero
and our model applies. In addition, our model assumes that the product is identical at the time
of harvest. In practice, the exporter may export diﬀerent varieties of mangoes and customers
may have preferences among those. Incorporating multiple product varieties prior to shipping
would be a valuable topic for future research.
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Appendices
A Summary of Notation
B Additional Technical Results of the Base Model
Proposition B.1. The best response of carrier i (i = 1, 2) is characterized by a piece-wise linear
and increasing function wˆi(w−i), which is expressed as follows:
wˆ1(w2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
wo1 if w2 < w
o
1 − θ¯Δt
w2+wo1+θ¯Δt
2 if w
o
1 − θ¯Δt ≤ w2 < w
o
1+θ¯Δt
2γ−1
1
γw2 if
wo1+θ¯Δt
2γ−1 ≤ w2 <
wo1+θ¯(a−t1)
2γ
wo1+θ¯(a−t1)
2 if w2 ≥
wo1+θ¯(a−t1)
2γ ,
(B.1)
and
wˆ2(w1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
wo2 if w1 < γw
o
2
w1
2γ +
wo2
2 if γw
o
2 ≤ w1 < γ(w
o
2+2θ¯Δt)
2γ−1
w1 − θ¯Δt if γ(w
o
2+2θ¯Δt)
2γ−1 ≤ w1 <
wo2+θ¯(2γ−1)(a−t2)
2
wo2+θ¯(a−t2)
2 if w1 ≥
wo2+θ¯(2γ−1)(a−t2)
2 .
(B.2)
Proposition B.2. Under the single sourcing strategy, the equilibrium is given by one of the
following four cases:
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Table 1: Summary of mathematical notation
Notation in the base model Superscripts
cp = production/procurement cost N : dual-sourcing equilibrium
h = inventory holding cost S: single-sourcing equilibrium
ι = interest rate to calculate h Shorthand notation
a = maximum potential quality of the product γ = a−t1a−t2
pi =selling price at time ti G(θ) = θ − F¯ (θ)f(θ)
θ = customer’s marginal utility Gˆ−1(x) = G−1(max{x,G(θ)})
F (θ) = cumulative distribution function of θ Notation in the model extensions
θ¯ = upper limit of θ b= parameter of power distribution
θi =cutoﬀ point of the shipment via carrier i K= setup cost for contracting with a carrier
ci = operating cost of carrier i βi= discount factor oﬀered by carrier i
ti = transportation time of carrier i
ri = freight rate of carrier i
wi = ri + cp + h(a− ti), full variable cost of carrier i
woi = ci + cp + h(a− ti), min. full variable cost of carrier i
Πci = proﬁt of carrier i
Πs = proﬁt of the shipper
Thresholds
Ωd: set of (wo1, wo2) for dual-mode shipping equilibria.
[wL1 (w
o
2), w
U
1 (w
o
2)]: interval of wo1 for dual-mode shipping equilibria for any given wo2
[φ(wo2), φ¯(w
o
2)]: interval of wo1 within which single sourcing is superior to dual sourcing
(i) If wo1 ≤ 2
√
γwo2 + (γ − 2
√
γ)θ¯(a − t2), then wS1 = w
o
1+θ¯(a−t1)
2 , w
S
2 = w
o
2 and the shipper
uses carrier 1 and obtains a proﬁt ΠSs =
[θ¯(a−t1)−wo1 ]2
16(θ¯−θ)(a−t1) .
(ii) if 2√γwo2 + (γ − 2
√
γ)θ¯(a − t2) < wo1 ≤
√
γwo2 + (γ −
√
γ)θ¯(a − t2), then wS1 =
√
γwo2 +
(γ − √γ)θ¯(a − t2), wS2 = wo2 and the shipper uses carrier 1 and obtains a proﬁt ΠSs =
[θ¯(a−t2)−wo2 ]2
4(θ¯−θ)(a−t2) ;
(iii) if √γwo2 + (γ −
√
γ)θ¯(a − t2) < wo1 ≤
√
γ
2 w
o
2 + (γ − 12
√
γ)θ¯(a − t2), then wS1 = wo1,
wS2 =
1√
γw
o
1 − (
√
γ − 1)θ¯(a − t2) and the shipper uses carrier 2 and obtains a proﬁt
ΠSs =
[θ¯(a−t1)−wo1 ]2
4(θ¯−θ)(a−t1) ;
(iv) if wo1 >
√
γ
2 w
o
2 + (γ −
√
γ
2 )θ¯(a − t2), then wS1 = wo1, wS2 =
wo2+θ(a−t2)
2 and the shipper uses
carrier 2 and obtains a proﬁt ΠSs =
[θ(a−t2)−wo2 ]2
16(θ¯−θ)(a−t2) .
Proposition B.3. For all wo2 ∈ [wL1 (wo2), wU1 (wo2)], we have wL1 (wo2) ≤ wp1(wo2) ≤ wU1 (wo2), and
ΠSs ≥ ΠNs if wo1 = wp1(wo2) where wp1(wo2) =
√
γwo2 + θ¯(a− t2)
[
γ −√γ].
Proposition B.4. For (wo1, w
o
2) /∈ Ωd, ΠSs ≤ ΠNs .
Proposition B.5. Suppose θ follows a general distribution that has an IFR. Given any freight
rates under which dual-mode shipping is optimal, the shipper’s optimal proﬁt is (i) decreasing
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in t1, t2, w1, w2, and (ii) increasing as the distribution of θ becomes larger in the ﬁrst-order
stochastic sense.
C Formulation and Technical Results of the Quantity-Discount
Model
The shipper’s problem, given discount schemes (ri, βi) (i = 1, 2), is adapted to
max
0≤θ2≤θ1≤θ¯
Πs(Θ) =
2∑
i=1
θi(ti+1 − ti) θ¯ − θi
θ¯
− (w1 − β1 θ¯ − θ1
θ¯
)
θ¯ − θ1
θ¯
− (w2 − β2 θ1 − θ2
θ¯
)
θ1 − θ2
θ¯
(C.1)
Denoting the optimal solution to Problem (C.1) by θ∗i (w,β)’s, carrier i solves
max
wi≥woi
2βi≤wi−woi+ci
Πci(wi, βi|w−i, β−i) = (wi − woi − βivi(w,β)) vi(w,β), (C.2)
where woi = ci + hti + cp, v1(w,β) =
θ¯−θ∗1(w,β)
θ¯
and v2(w,β) =
θ∗1(w,β)−θ∗2(w,β)
θ¯
.
Proposition C.1. (i) Necessary condition for dual-mode shipping: If the shipper uses both
carriers in a Nash equilibrium, the discount schemes (wNi , β
N
i ) in this equilibrium must be a
solution to the following system of equations:
∂Πci(wi, βi|wN−i, βN−i)
∂wi
|wi=wNi ,βi=βNi = 0, β
N
i =
wNi − woi + ci
2
, for i = 1, 2 and −i = i. (C.3)
(ii) Necessary condition for single-mode shipping: Given any ﬁxed (w−i, β−i), if carrier i’s best
response is to entice the shipper to exclusively use it, its optimal discount scheme is given by the
following optimization problem
max
wi,βi
Πci(wi, βi|w−i, β−i) =
(
wi − woi − βi( θ¯−θ
S
i
θ¯
)
)
θ¯−θSi
θ¯
(C.4)
s.t. 2βi ≤ wi − woi + ci (C.5)
(θ¯(a−ti)−wi)2
4(θ¯(a−ti)−βi) ≥
(θ¯(a−t−i)−w−i)2
4(θ¯(a−t−i)−β−i) (C.6)
B(βi, β−i) ≥ 0 (C.7)
Proposition C.2. The optimal solution to Problem (C.4)-(C.7) must satisfy one of the following
properties: (a) wˆi(w−i, β−i) = wMi and βˆi(w−i, β−i) = β
M
i where w
M
i =
θ¯2(a−ti)2+θ¯(a−ti)woi−βMi woi
2θ¯(a−ti)−βMi
and βMi =
1
4
(
4θ¯(a− ti) + ci −
√
8θ¯2(a− ti)2 − 8θ¯(a− ti)ci + 8θ¯(a− ti)woi + c2i
)
; (b) (θ¯(a−ti)−wˆi(w−i,β−i))
2
θ¯(a−ti)−βˆi(w−i,β−i) =
(θ¯(a−t−i)−w−i)2
θ¯(a−t−i)−β−i ; (c) B(βˆi(w−i, β−i), β−i) = 0.
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Based on the necessary conditions in Propositions C.1 and C.2, we develop the following
procedure to compute dual-mode shipping equilibria (if any) in the quantity-discount model.
The idea is to ﬁrst generate all potential equilibria according to the necessary condition in part
(i) of Proposition C.1 and then check for each of the potential equilibria if dual-mode shipping is
indeed optimal from the shipper’s perspective (by Proposition 7) and if neither carrier is better
oﬀ deviating from the current solution to the one that attracts the shipper to use it exclusively
(by part (ii) of Proposition C.1). As a limitation, we note that Algorithm 1 ﬁnds dual-mode
shipping equilibria, if any, but it does not rule out the possibility that there might be other
single-mode shipping equilibria.
Algorithm 1 (Finding Nash equilibria for dual-mode shipping). Let S be an empty set.
Step 1. Obtain all of the solutions to equations (C.3), denoted by (wD,11 , β
D,1
1 , w
D,1
2 , β
D,1
2 ), (w
D,2
1 , β
D,2
1 , w
D,2
2 , β
D,2
2 ),
..., (wD,M1 , β
D,M
1 , w
D,M
2 , β
D,M
2 ).
Step 2. For each m = 1, 2, ...,M , if (wD,m1 , β
D,m
1 , w
D,m
2 , β
D,m
2 ) satisﬁes B(β
D,m) < 0 and inequali-
ties (11) and (12), let S := S ∪ {(wD,m1 , βD,m1 , wD,m2 , βD,m2 )}.
Step 3. For each element (wD,m
′
1 , β
D,m′
1 , w
D,m′
2 , β
D,m′
2 ) in S and each i = 1, 2 and −i = i, check the
following: Given (wD,m
′
−i , β
D,m′
−i ), does the optimal solution to Problem (C.4)-(C.7) give
carrier i a higher proﬁt than (wD,m
′
i , β
D,m′
i )? If yes, remove (w
D,m′
−i , β
D,m′
−i ) from S.
Step 4. Output the set S.
Under the single-sourcing strategy, the game reaches a Nash equilibrium until one of the
carriers cannot further adjust the discount scheme and ends up with a zero proﬁt. This leads to
the following proposition.
Proposition C.3. Under the single sourcing strategy, carrier i will be selected if and only if
(θ¯(a−ti)−wlimi )2
4(θ¯(a−ti)−βlimi )
≥ (θ¯(a−t−i)−w
lim
−i )
2
4(θ¯(a−t−i)−βlim−i )
where
wlimi =
1
2
(
3θ¯(a− ti) + 3woi − ci −
√
(3θ¯(a− ti) + woi )2 − 10ciθ¯(a− ti) + c2i + 2ciwoi )
)
and βlimi =
wlimi −woi+ci
2 for i = 1, 2. Moreover, in equilibrium carrier i’s quotation (w
S
i , β
S
i ) sat-
isﬁes the following: (i) If (θ¯(a−ti)−w
M
i )
2
4(θ¯(a−ti)−βMi )
≥ (θ¯(a−t−i)−w
lim
−i )
2
4(θ¯(a−t−i)−βlim−i )
, (wSi , β
S
i ) = (w
M
i , β
M
i ); (ii) otherwise,
θ¯(a− ti)− wSi =
√
θ¯(a−ti)−βSi
θ¯(a−t−i)−βlim−i
(
θ¯(a− t−i)− wlim−i
)
.
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